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CALIFORNIA PACKING COR-
PORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
No. 6049 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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CALIFORNIA PACKING COR-
PORArriON, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE rrAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
No. 6049 
To The IIonorable Chief Justice and To The Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah: 
Comes now the defendant in the above entitled cause 
and petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing upon 
said cause of action for the reasons and upon the grounds 
herein briefly set forth as follows: 
I. 
THAT the construction given of subhead (1s't) of 
subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, might not accompli'sh the 
result intended by the Court. 
[ .. g 
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II. 
THAT there are seeming inconsistencies between the 
construction and the application of the section. 
III. 
THAT as an alternative measure of the gross re-
ceipts from the business done in the state, the factor 
adopted by the defendant should be the measure of the 
gross receipts. 
In support of these contentions defendant submits 
the following points which are based entirely upon argu-
ment's not previously cited to this Court in 'this cause, 
and respectfully prays this Honorable Court to grant a 
rehearing to the defendant in the above entitled cause 
of action. 
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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
I. 
The Construction Given of Subhead (1st) of Subdivi-
sion (e) of Subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Might Not Accomp-
lish the Result Intended by the Court. 
A study of the opinion of 'the majority of the Court 
indicates that, in effect, a decision was rendered in favor 
of the Tax Commission, your petitioner. The Court held, 
however, that the Commission was in error in the method 
used in determining the amount of net income to be at-
tributable to business done in the state, but that it was 
justified under the statute in arriving at the same result 
by the statutory method; that the Commission should 
not have departed from the statutory formula in the 
present case, but if it had used subhead (1st) of sub-
division (e) of subsection 6 of 8ection 80-13-21, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, as interpreted by the Court, such 
would yield "in the main, results closely akin to those 
which the Commi'ssion sought to accomplish by departing 
from the statutory formula.'' 
It is your petitioner's position that the Commission 
is unable to accomplish these results because the inter-
pretation placed on the sales factor by the Court might 
not alloca'te to business done within the state any gross re-
ceipts from the sales in question. 
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The section as quoted from the Court's opinion with 
'the bracketed interpolations is a follows: 
"(1st) Sales [within the State] except those 
negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation 
by agents or agencie<s chiefly situated at, connected 
with or sent out from premises owned or rented 
by the corporation [within 'the State] for the 
transaction of business outside of this State, and 
sales [wherever made] otherwise determined by 
the Tax Commission to be attributable to the busi-
ness conducted on such premises [owned or rented 
by the corporation within this State for the trans-
action of business outside of this State]." 
If this section is applied in this form, the effect of 
the decision is to order the Commission to aHocate to 
S'ales in Utah most of the sales which the Commission 
had included as the measure of gross receipts in the 
original decision of the Commission. All sales of goods 
which have been manufactured or stored in Utah prior 
to their sale are to be included as sales in Utah, unless 
they are within the exception. 
We have arrived at this conclusion from the Court's 
repudiation of the plaintiff's construction of the section 
in the following words: 
"This results in excepting from gross income 
attributable to Utah all sales made in the State 
from goods manufactured and/ or stored in the 
State if the agent of the Company negotiating the 
sales is sent into the 8Jtate to make them. It is 
hard to conceive that the legislature in enacting a 
franchise tax law on foreign corporations doing 
business in this State would provide them such a 
5 
simple way of avoiding the tax. Goods are manu-
factured in the State, stored here, sold here to 
merchants or jobbers in the State, the money re-
ceived therefor, but i's not included in the income 
attributable to busine1ss done within the State be-
cause 1the salesman of the Company comes in from 
or is connected with an office outside of this 
State. Such meaning renders senseless the con-
cluding clause of the 'section reading: 'and sales 
otherwise determined by the Tax Commission to 
be attributable to the business conducted on such 
premises.' (Italics added) • • •" 
The Court has thus held that the plaintiff Company 
has read the statute with the wrong transposition. The 
Court has declared that the Company cannot avoid the 
tax by considering the'se sales as not being attributable 
to Utah business. It was held that if any transposition 
should be made to give the section meaning, the words 
"by the corporation" should be transposed so that a 
new meaning is put on the statute. 
'' ( 11st) Sales except those negotiated or ef-
fected in behalf of the corporation by agents or 
agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent 
out from premises owned or rented by the corpor-
ation, for the transaction of business outside of 
this state, and sale's otherwise determined by the 
Tax Commission to be attributable to the business 
conducted on such premises.'' 
Such meaning finally results in the holding that all 
sales of goods which have been manufactured, or which 
are stored within Utah, are to be included as sales made 
in Utah, with the exception of certain sales. Our inter-
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pretation of this exception will be discussed under Point 
II. 
Your petitioner has taken the liberty of summarizing 
what the Court has held, in denying the contention of the 
Company, in order to raise the question whether, on the 
authority of such holding the Commission would be 
justified in determining that the Company's sales were 
Utah sales. Can the Commission act on the premise that 
if the sales were not within the exception as defined by 
the Court, such sales are to be assigned to Utah as gross 
receipts from business done in Utah. The Court has 
not in so many words answered this question, although 
it has inferred as much. The Court has implied that be-
cause this section brings into the state, as business done 
in the s'tate, all sales, wherever made or consummated, 
of Utah goods, it is unnecessary for the Commission to 
use Subsection 8 except for isolated transactions which 
might ostensibly come under the exception. 
Your petitioner reluctantly admits that, in the ab-
sence of a specific ruling to this effect, there remains a 
serious doubt that it should adopt such an implication 
as settled law. 
II. 
There Are Seeming Inconsistencies between the 
Construction and the Application of the Section. 
All sales of products manufactured or stored in Utah 
prior to sale are to be attributed to Utah, except those 
''sales which may be handled from offices or premises 
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within the state to a purchaser without the state for 
shipment out of the state, as made by an agent of the 
Company chiefly engaged in out-of-state sales and busi-
ness.'' 
Any sale which does not come within this exception 
is to be considered as a Utah sale. The Court seems 
to limit the exception to only those sales made to an 
out-of-state purchaser by an agent of a Utah sales office 
which is operated for the transaction of out-of-state 
business. 
We respectfully submit that this interpretation of 
subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Sec-
tion 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, would be 
clear were there not conflicting and ambiguous state-
ments in the remainder of the opinion. Without some 
amplification and clarification of these conflicting state-
ments, it is impossible for the Commission to redetermine 
the tax of this Company in conformity with the decision 
of the Court. 
As stated above, the Commission could act on the 
premise that because the sales of the Company were not 
within the exception as defined by the Court, such sales 
are to be assigned to Utah as gross receipts from busi-
ness done in Utah. The Court has, however, failed to de-
cide, in so many words, whether these sales are within 
the exception. 
The construction of the section, as outlined in the 
first paragraph after the quotation of the statute with 
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its bracketed interpolations, might be analyzed by con-
sidering the separate sentences. The first pertinent sen-
tence is: 
"To secure this result, and to avoid objection 
on constitutional grounds of double taxation, it 
except'S from sales the income of which is used 
in computing the tax those which may be handled 
from offices or premise'S within the state to a pur-
chaser without the state for shipment out of the 
state, if made by an agent of the company chiefly 
engaged in out-of-state sales and business." 
This sentence would except sales which have been 
handled from a sales office within the state; but in the 
case at bar the sales office of the Company, from which 
all sales were made, was in San Francisco, California. 
This, then, does not answer your petitioner's question. 
The second sentence reads: 
"Sales otherwi'se made of goods within the 
state for shipment out of the state are deemed to 
be sales made and business done within ~the state, 
and enter into the income from which the tax is 
computed.'' 
This genei1al statement, which we believe is the 
essence of the opinion, implies that the Court considers 
any sale of goods located within the state at the tim~ of 
the sale to be made in the state, irrespective of where 
the contract is consummated, where the buyer is located, 
or the location of the sales office. 
In effect, and for all intents and purposes, your pe-
tioner arrived at the same conclusion in its decision, 
entered as Item 21, Record of Proceedings. The Com-
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mission ordered that the proposed deficiency be redeter-
mined in accordance with the following rules: 
''It is our opinion that in determining the al-
location factor of gross receipts from sales assign-
able to business of the petitioner done within this 
state, there should be included only the sales price 
of all goods which were actually located in Utah 
at the time of sale, whether manufactured or 
packed in Utah or outside Utah, and irrespective 
of the destination of the shipments. This would 
require a change of the proposed deficiency by 
adjusting the factor of gross receipts from sales 
assignable to Utah by subtracting from the amount 
assigned to Utah the sales price of •all goods manu-
factured or packed in Utah and shipped and 
stored outside Utah prior to sale, and by adding 
to such figure the sales price of all goods manu-
f·actured or packed outside Utah and shipped into 
and stored in Utah prior to its sale.'' 
Thus, we see that your petitioner has already rend-
ered a decision which would include precisely the same 
sales to make up a numerator of the gross receipts frac-
tion which the Court has held should make up this numer-
ator, but which the Court has held should be labeled 
"sales in Utah" rather than "gross receipts from busi-
ness done in Utah." If the Commission makes this change 
in terminology, will it accomplish the result intended by 
the Court~ 
The next two sentences of the paragraph under dis-
cussion are particularly confusing to your petitioner and, 
we are certain, give the Company some justification for 
contesting the •above interpretation of the decision. 
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The third sen tense reads: 
''This construction also puts in'to the income 
of business done within the state the proceeds of 
sales of goods manufactured or stored within the 
state but sold for shipment out of the state, where 
the sale is made through a broker or jobber within 
the state rather than through an out-of-state agent 
or employee of the company.'' 
If the last phrase of this sentence-" rather than 
through an out-of-state agent or employee of the com-
pany"-had not been appended there would not have 
been this confusion, for it gives rise to an implication 
that if the sale is made through an out-of-state agent or 
employee of the Company, such sale should not be in-
cluded in the income of business done within the state. 
This, of course, is inconsistent with the preceding sen-
tences. 
We submit that the Court should either limit the 
above sentence or amplify it so that it will be consistent 
with the remainder of the paragraph. 
The last pertinent sentence is as follows: 
"We repe·at, the exception goes only to sales 
to an out-of-state party when the agent of the 
company making the sale is chiefly connected with 
out-of-state business and such others made from 
premises maintained for out-of-state business as 
the Tax Commission may determine to be atltribut-
able to business done out of the state." 
This sentence is even more confusing to your peti-
tioner than the previous, because it is impossible to deter-
mine what is meant by the words "chiefly connected with 
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out-of-state business." If these words are meant to 
include a sales agent sent from a San Francisco office 
to sell goods in eight intermountain states, Utah among 
them, then the sales of such agent in the State of Utah 
might come within the exception. Would it then mean 
that the r:rax Commission could not allocate to the state, 
as sales in the state, the sales made by such an agent to 
all purchasers if the goods are located in Utah at the 
time of the sale1 If such allocation cannot be made, then 
the result which the Court has intended could not be ac-
complished by the use of the sales factor. 
If, however, these words are modified so as to apply 
only to offices maintained in the state for out-of-state 
business, the apparent inconsistency would be settled 
without further elucidation. Your petitioner contends 
that the Commission cannot apply subhead (1st) of sub-
division (e) of subsection 6, so long as this sentence is 
in its present form. 
We respectfully suggest that the Court might render 
a valuable service in instructing your petitioner as to 
the full meaning intended by the decision, so that the 
Tax Commission may be governed accordingly in its 
future procedure. 
III. 
As an Alternative Measure of the Gross Receipts 
from the Business Done in the State, the Factor 
Adopted by the Defendant Should Be the Meas-
ure of the Gross Receipts. 
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The Court has ruled that the Commission has auth-
ority to depart from the statutory formula under certain 
circumstances, but that it was not necessary to do so in 
the case at bar, because the same result could have been 
accomplished by using the sales factor in arriving at 
gross receipts from business done by the Company in 
Utah. In our original brief and in our argument there 
has not been advanced the Commission's interpretation 
of subhead (1st) of subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of 
Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. This 
was not an oversight, but a deliberate omission, because 
we maintained, and still contend, that gross receipts 
attributable to Utah business can be arrived at by a 
different measure under the authority of subsection 8. 
If the Court will elucidate its decision so that the Com-
mission has no doubt in its mind but that it can include 
the sales above discussed as Utah sales, the discussion 
of the following point may be disregarded. If, however, 
the Court, is unable to reconcile the facts of this case 
with the seeming inconsistencies incident to its opinion, 
we respectfully submit that the factor adopted by the 
Commission as the measure of the gross receipts from 
business done in Utah should be used as an alternative 
basis. 
The Court has not ruled whether the Tax Commis-
sion is justified in determining gross receipts from some 
other factor than sales as defined by subhead (1st) of 
subdivision (e) of subsection 6 of Section 80-13-21, Re-
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vised Statutes of Ut,ah, 1933. The Court has recognized 
the fact that the Tax Commission has not attempted, in 
allocating the income of the Company, to apply the sales 
factor as set forth in the above mentioned subdivision, 
but the Court has overlooked the fact that the Commis-
sion in place of the sales factor has used a different 
factor to arrive at the gross receipts attributable to 
business done in Utah. 
The Commission has considered receipts from busi-
ness done in the state as being synonymous with the 
value of the product produced in the state, so far as 
manufacturing companies are concerned. V1alue is ordi-
narily measured in dollars and cents, as evidenced by 
the price received from 'the product when it is transferred 
to another person. Because the product was not sold 
in the state does not mean that the value of the product 
produced in the state could not be found. If this Com-
pany's 'total production in every state were the same, 
that is, if the goods produced in Utah were of the same 
quality and specifications as the goods produced in all 
other states, it would be simple to measure the gross 
receipts from business done in this state in proportion 
to 'the gross receipts from business done in all states. 
Thus, if the Company's total operations produced 100,000 
cans of, let us say, tomatoes, and of this total 20,000 
cans were produced in Utah, it would be reasonable to 
hold that one-fifth of the receipts were attributable to 
Utah operations. This is not possible, however, due to 
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the fact that the quality and specifications of goods pro-
duced in Utah vary from the goods produced by the 
company's total opemtions. There must necessarily be 
a better measuring rod than the number of units pro-
duced. 
When a manufacturing company is under considera-
tion, the only logical solution is to find the value in 
money of the product resulting from Utah operations 
in comparison to the value in money of the product of all 
operations. As far as the Company at bar was con-
cerned, the only means of calculating the value of the 
product was to use the price of the product when it 
was finally exchanged for money. It was only then that 
the value was in any way reduced to dollars and cents. 
If the Company, 'at the conclusion of the production opera-
tions and at the time the goods were ready for shipment 
out of the state, had entered on its books the inventory 
value of the goods, such factor could be taken as the 
value of the goods produced in Utah or the gross re-
ceipts assignable to business done in Utah. But the 
value of these goods was not reduced to dollars and cents 
until they were sold, which sales were consummated out 
of the state in most instances. Such was the theory 
inclining the Commission to disregard the sales factor 
and adopt a different factor to arrive at the numerator 
and denominator making up gross receipts. 
We submit that the Court could readily hold (since 
the resul't of such a procedure is approximately the same 
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as that of the Court's opinion) that this method should 
be upheld in order to arrive at a fair and equitable 
proportion of the gross receipts of the Company in the 
case at bar. There then would be no need to clarify 
the Court's opinion or to reconcile the seeming incon-
sistencies. The Court has inferred that the Commission 
was justified in finding that the operations of the Com-
pany in the year 1935 resulted in gross receipts in Utah. 
We have stated above that if the Company had 
reduced 'the value of its Utah products before shipment 
out of the state to an inventory value, the Commission 
could have used such a value to arrive at the gross re-
ceipts. It was for this purpose that the Commission 
on page 14 of the hearing asked if it were possible to 
make a separate accounting of the Utah operations. The 
answer was in the affirmative. Thereupon the Chairman 
of the Commission asked that a return be filed on a 
separate accounting basis. In reply to the stipulation and 
understanding the Company was given an opportunity to 
file on such separate accounting basis. Evidently its 
counsel misinterpreted the Commission's reasons for 
wanting such return on a separate accounting, attribut-
ing it to one reason- that of securing more tax for the 
state. But the main reason why such a return was re-
quested was to ascertain from the Company's own report 
the receipts from business done in Utah. Item 17 of the 
Record of Proceedings, which deals with reasons why the 
Company did not furnish such a return, does not discuss 
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whether the records reveal the receipts from business 
done in the sta'te, but outlines the difficulty the auditors 
experienced in prorating the overhead expenses, factors 
which were not germane to the issue. 
We submit that the Tax Commission was justified 
in asking for such a return of information, and upon 
the refusal of the Company to furnish the same, it was 
justified in adopting what it deemed to be the next best 
measure of arriving at the gross receipts. 
Therefore, we respectfully suggest that as an alter-
native, should the Court's definition of sales in Utah be 
held inapplicable, the Commission's decision on this 
point be approved. 
SUMMARY 
Your petitioner has attempted herein to set forth its 
interpretation of the opinion heretofore rendered. Al-
though it is not our intent or desire to ask the Court 
to reverse the result it has reached, we do petition the 
Court to confirm the implications deduced therefrom 
by your petitioner. In simple terms we are asking if the 
sales of the plaintiff Company are sales made in Utah. 
We :are inclined to believe that it was the Court's intent 
to hold that such sales should not be excluded from the 
measure of the tax. Wherein 'the opinion has failed to 
accomplish this result and wherein there are seeming 
inconsistencies has been discussed in some detail. 
Your petitioner further contends that as an alterna-
tive procedure there be adopted as the rule the measure 
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originally used by the Commission. We submit that such 
a measure will reconcile and obviate all seeming incon-
sistencies, yet allocate to Utah the proportion of net in-
come fairly and equitably attributable to this state. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE 
I, Alvin I. Sm1th, attorney for the above named de-
fendant, do hereby certify that in my opinion there is 
good reason to believe that the Judgment heretofore 
entered in the above entitled cause is erroneous in the 
respect set forth in the foregoing Petition for Rehearing 
and that the above cause should therefore be reexamined. 
ALVIN I. SMITH. 
